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Serial Fiction, The End? 
 
Andrew  McGonigal  (2013)  presents  some  interesting  data 
concerning  truth  in  serial  fictions.  Such  data  has  been  taken  by 
McGonigal,  Cameron,  and  Caplan  to  motivate  some  form  of 
contextualism or relativism. I argue, however, that many of these 
approaches are problematic, and that all are undermotivated as the 
data  can  be  explained  in  a  standard  invariantist  semantic 
framework given some independently plausible principles. 
 
1. Introduction 
As Kripke (2013: 57) notes, typical utterances of sentences such as 
 
1.  Chewbacca is a Wookie, 
 
count as correct iff they are true according to the appropriate story. The contrast between (1) 
and 
 
2.  Chewbacca is a human, 
 
then, is to be accounted for by the difference in the truth of (3) and (4): 
 
3.  According to the Star Wars films, Chewbacca is a Wookie. 
4.  According to the Star Wars films, Chewbacca is a human. 
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(3) is true, so the thought goes, and this underlies the acceptability of (1), whereas (4) is false 
and underlies the unacceptability of (2).
1 
 
To say that the correctness of sentences such as (1) and (2) go hand-in-hand with the truth of 
sentences like (3) and (4) is not to make any claims about the logical form of (1) and (2). In 
particular, to appeal to such a link is not to claim that (1) expresses the proposition expressed 
by (3), or even that (1) is itself true. For the purposes of our discussion, we need take no stand 
on these issues, and so I shall speak only of the correctness of sentences such as (1). 
 
What I want to address in this paper is a puzzle for an account of the correctness conditions 
of sentence such as (1) raised by McGonigal (§2-3). In §4-§5 I discuss and assess extant 
contextualist and relativist accounts of the puzzle, arguing that the contextualist proposals are 
problematic. Then (§6) I outline my own preferred invariantist approach, before defusing (§7-
§8)  two  objections  to  my  proposal.  The  availability  of  this  invariantist  account  thus 
undermines the motivation for contextualism and relativism. 
 
2. McGonigal’s Data 
McGonigal argues that serial fictions, such as the Star Wars films, whose production and 
reception are via “relevantly discontinuous episodes or instalments” and that are “construable 
as  taking  place  within  a  single  fictional  world”  (McGonigal  2013:165),  present  a  set  of 
                                                           
1 Kripke’s account is used here for concreteness. We do not commit to it being the best way of accounting for 
the contrast between (1) and (2). Ironically, Kripke (2013: 58-59) thinks that since ‘Chewbacca’ is an empty 
name, sentences like (1) cannot express propositions and hence cannot be true. If this is correct, how can any 
embedding of (1), such as (3), be true? Kripke, it appears, is not entitled to his own theory of the correctness of 
(1)! This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
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distinctive data that any theory of fictional truth must account for. McGonigal illustrates this 
by considering the following hypothetical case. 
 
In 1977 Young Girl is watching Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (henceforth Hope) and 
she utters 
 
5.  Luke is Vader’s son. 
 
 Following McGonigal, 
 
Let us stipulate that the story of its immediate sequel The Empire Strikes 
Back  [henceforth  Empire],  which  portrays  Darth  Vader  as  Luke 
Skywalker’s father, has not yet been constructed—in fact, since nobody 
expects [Hope] to be a success, the possibility of making a sequel hasn’t 
even occurred to anyone. Let us also stipulate, as seems overwhelmingly 
plausible, that there is no evidence whatsoever in the first film that Vader 
is Luke’s father, and ample evidence against it (McGonigal 2013: 166). 
 
In 1980, after the release of Empire, Adult Woman is watching Hope and without knowing 
about the existence of Empire, she also utters (5). As McGonigal points out it is striking that 
Young Girl’s utterance as assessed in 1977 is markedly worse than Adult Woman’s utterance 
as assessed in 1980. The task for a an account of the correctness conditions of (5) is to 
explain why Young Girl’s utterance is worse than Adult Woman’s.
2 
                                                           
2 To say that  Adult Woman’s utterance is better than Young Girl’s is to not to deny that  Adult Woman’s 
utterance is pathological, given her evidence. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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So how should we explain our differing assessments of Young Girl’s and Adult Woman’s 
utterances?  A  natural  first  thought  is  to  posit  a  difference  in  the  correctness  of  their 
utterances. There appear to be two broad ways in which we could secure such a difference in 
correctness. First, we could say that because of the different contexts involved, the fiction 
that was relevant to our assessment of Young Girl’s Utterance was Hope, whereas the fiction 
that was relevant to assessing Adult Woman’s utterances was the composite fiction of Hope 
plus Empire. Alternatively, we could treat McGonigal’s case as an instance of change over 
time, in the way that we would account for the difference in the correctness of an utterance of 
‘Thatcher is Prime Minister’ made and assessed in 1977 compared to one made and assessed 
in 1980. Both approaches are found in the literature. I’ll explore the prospects of accounting 
for  McGonigal’s  data  in  these  ways  (§4-§5),  before  arguing  (§6)  for  my  own  preferred 
treatment of the data which does not posit a difference in the correctness of utterances of (5). 
But first, I’ll briefly examine some more of McGonigal’s putative data. 
 
3. More Data and The Contradiction Problem 
McGonigal (2013: 166) also claims that a similar contrast can be generated by considering 
utterances of 
 
6.  According to Hope, Luke is Vader’s son,
3 
and 
7.  In Hope, Luke is Vader’s son. 
                                                           
3 In fact McGonigal uses ‘it is true according to this film’ in the context of watching Hope, but nothing turns on 
this. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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Now  whilst  I  agree  that  our  assessment  of  utterances  of  (7)  mirrors  our  assessment  of 
utterances of (5), it strikes me that McGonigal is incorrect regarding (6): both Young Girl’s 
and Adult Woman’s utterances of (6) are infelicitous. And Cameron (2012: 192) seemingly 
agrees. Compare what we would say about a witness who provides a report on the 8
th of 
August such that it is not the case that according to the report that P, just as Young Girl’s 
utterance of (6) is false when she made it. If our witness then provided a further report on the 
12
th of August saying that P, this does not lead us to revise our verdict on the earlier report: it 
is still not the case that according to the earlier report that P. And this holds even if, according 
to the combined reports, P. But this later report is analogous to the next instalment of the Star 
Wars series, Empire. So the fact that according to Empire, Luke is Vader’s son, and indeed 
the fact that according to Hope+Empire, Luke is Vader’s son does not undermine the claim 
that (6) is false.
4 
 
The above argument depends on ‘according to the fiction operators’ behaving analogously to 
other ‘according to’ operators. But this does seem to be the case. For one thing, the meaning 
of ‘according to Hope’ looks compositional: it is for that reason that my class understands 
what I mean by it with very little prompting. Second, ‘according to Hope’ is intensional like 
other ‘according-to’ operators and seemingly for the same reasons: that someone or some 
evidence says that P does not settle P’s truth; that someone says ‘a is F’ does not mean that 
there is an a; that someone says ‘a is F’ does not mean that they said ‘b is F’ even when a=b. 
                                                           
4 That our assessment of (6) and (7) come apart is not particularly strange since, as Sainsbury (2014) has noted, 
the relevant operators do have different truth conditions: in War and Peace, there are both fictional and real 
characters, but not according to War and Peace, there are both fictional and real characters. As Sainsbury notes, 
‘in’ permits a more distanced stance with respect to the fiction than ‘according to’. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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Third, we can agglomerate fictional according to operators. When discussing agglomeration 
of fictional operators Sainsbury (2009: §6.2) explicitly compares such operators with witness 
statements  which  can  also  be  agglomerated.  The  comparison  is  supposed  to  provide  an 
analogy: “Just as we can agglomerate the evidence from witnesses to generate a larger story 
than that told by any one of them, so we can agglomerate fictions” (2009: 123). Fourth, 
Sainsbury (2014: 279) notes that intuitively, (A) is true whereas (B) is false: (A) In the play 
Othello, Othello often speaks in magnificent blank verse; (B) According to the play Othello, 
Othello often speaks in magnificent blank verse. Sainsbury notes that for (B) “to be true, the 
play  would  have  to  tell  us  that  Othello  speaks  in  verse”.  Fifth,  like  other  according  to 
operators, fictional according to operators are non-monotonic in the sense I describe below. 
All this suggests that ‘according to Hope’ is like other ‘according to’ operators, in that our 
assessments of what is true according to Hope ought not to vary. 
 
Caplan (2014: 69-71), however, gives an argument for the changing correctness of (6) which 
he  then  takes  to  motivate  his  own  temporalist  solution  (see  §5).  Caplan’s  ‘contradiction 
problem’ consists in the prima facie truth of the following:
5 
 
8.  Hope is a part of Hope+Empire. 
9.  It is not the case that according to Hope+Empire, Vader is Luke’s father and Vader is 
not Luke’s father. 
                                                           
5 Caplan talks about the relevant claims being true in the relevant fiction rather than according to the relevant 
fiction. Tillman (2014), however, presents the Caplan’s argument in terms of the according to operators. On the 
account of ‘in’ sentences that I sketch at the end of §6, the analogue of (10) is false and so the alleged problem 
does not even arise. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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10. According to Hope, Vader is not Luke’s father, but according to Hope+Empire, Vader 
is Luke’s father. 
 
Caplan, however, thinks that there is a problem with accepting (8)-(10) since, although they 
are not contradictory, they are “at least weird” (2014: 70). As it stands, this is not much of an 
objection. Indeed, (8)-(10) strike me unproblematically true. Caplan only adds that the truth 
of (8)-(10) is “a bit like a consistent set of propositions being inconsistent with one of its 
subsets”  (2014:  70).  But  in  one  obvious  sense  (8)-(10)  are  not  like  that,  since  it  is 
contradictory to suppose that a consistent set of propositions is inconsistent with one of its 
subsets. So it is not clear in what sense Caplan’s analogy is supposed to help us understand 
the weirdness of (8)-(10).
6 
 
Caplan’s solution is to deny (10) by saying that the correctness of (6) changes and so (6) is 
now correct. If this is the only way out of Caplan’s puzzle, then we should conclude with 
McGonigal that there is a contrast between Young Girl’s and Adult Woman’s utterances of 
(6). 
 
But it is easy to show that the truth of (8)-(10) is not problematic, and so we are not forced to 
say  that  different  utterances  of  (6)  differ  in  felicity.  For  instance,  Lewis  (1978)  has  a 
particularly elegant explanation of (8)-(10). The pattern exemplified by (8)-(10) can be given 
by the following, where O is a sentential operator: 
                                                           
6 Cook (2014) claims that the Luke of Hope is distinct from the Luke of Hope+Empire, since he thinks that (10) 
shows that the Lukes of these fictions have incompatible properties. But (10) no more shows this than the fact 
that according to the Ancients, Hesperus is not visible in the morning, and according to Kripke,  Hesperus is 
visible in the morning shows that the Ancients and Kripke were not talking about the same planet. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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11. O(A, C) & O(A&B, ~C) 
 
Let us call an operator, O, which allows for instances of (11) ‘strongly non-monotonic’ (an 
operator which allows for instances of O(A, C) & ~O(A&B, C) is weakly non-monotonic). 
 
Lewis  held,  and  it  is  widely  accepted,  that  counterfactual  conditionals  are  weakly  non-
monotonic in the sense that 
 
  Antecedent Strengthening: (A > C) ⊃ ((A&B) > C) 
 
is invalid, and, moreover, are strongly non-monotonic in that (A > C) & ((A&B) > ~C) is 
consistent.
7 
 
Moreover, Lewis cashes out truth in fiction in the following terms: 
 
12. According to Hope, Vader is not Luke’s father iff if Hope were told as known fact, 
Vader would not be Luke’s father. 
 
13. According to Hope+Empire, Vader is Luke’s father iff if Hope+Empire was told as 
known fact, Vader would be Luke’s father. 
 
Now given the strong non-monotonicity of counterfactuals, it is clear that the counterfactuals 
on the right hand side of (12) and (13) can both be true and so (10) can be true as well. 
                                                           
7 See section 9 of my 2014 for a defence of the invalidity of Antecedent Strengthening. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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Moreover, the truth of (10) does not turn on whether or not Hope+Empire is contradictory, 
which it isn’t, nor on whether Hope is a part of Hope+Empire, which it is. So Lewis explains 
the data Caplan finds puzzling. 
 
More generally, the question is whether according to operators strongly non-monotonic? If 
they are, (8)-(10) are inconsistent, if they are not, then the objection lapses. But it is clear that 
according to operators are strongly non-monotonic in general. It can be true according to 
evidence E, Smith did it (or is most likely to have done it), whereas according to evidence 
E+F, Jones, not Smith, did it. So given that there is no problem in general with strongly non-
monotonic operators, it is not clear why according to operators should not be strongly non-
monotonic in the case of fictions.
8 As such, a commitment to (8)-(10) is unproblematic as 
such phenomena are predicated by an independently motivated non-monotonic account of 
according to operators. 
 
So I dispute McGonigal’s account of the data. Nevertheless, although some of what I say 
below presupposes this, much of what I say can be amended if we side with McGonigal 
regarding (6). In particular, the positive account of the data that I propose can be amended to 
account  for  varying  assessments  in  (6)  along  the  lines  of  my  account  of  our  varying 
assessment of (7). 
 
                                                           
8 Similarly, Sainsbury (2014) claims that since (i) according to The Murder of Roger Ackroyd, Parker did not 
phone Dr Sheppard, it cannot be the case that (ii) according to the early chapters of The Murder of Roger 
Ackroyd, Parker phoned Dr Sheppard. Sainsbury’s thinks this because The Murder of Roger Ackroyd is not an 
inconsistent fiction. But why think that endorsing (i) and (ii) makes Ackroyd an inconsistent fiction? One reason 
would be the monotonicity of ‘according to’ operators. But as we have seen, it seems more plausible to think 
that fictional operators are non-monotonic.  This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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4. Context-Sensitivity 
Building on the work of MacFarlane (2009) and Weatherson (2009), we can delineate four 
ways  in  which  we  can  accommodate  the  thought  that  different  contextually-determined 
fictions are relevant to assessing Young Girl’s and Adult Woman’s utterances of (5). The 
four options are given by the answers to two questions.
9 First, do the relevant fictions affect 
the content of the correctness conditions of utterances of (5)? Views that answer ‘yes’ are 
indexicalist. An alternative says that although the contextually-determined fictions do not 
affect the correctness condition common to Young Girl’s and Adult Woman’s utterances of 
(5), the correctness of their utterances differs since this correctness condition is true/false 
relative to the contextually-determined fiction. Such views are nonindexicalist. 
 
Second, we can ask whether the relevant fictions are supplied by the speaker’s context or by 
the assessor’s context (this nonexhaustive list seems to exhaust the plausible options)? Views 
which take the former option, we’ll label contextualist, whereas those which take the latter 
option, we’ll call relativist. Combing the possible answers to these questions generates four 
views: 
 
  Which context determines the relevant fiction? 
The Speaker’s Context  The Assessor’s Context 
The  contextually  relevant 
fiction affects the correctness 
conditions 
Indexical Contextualism  Indexical Relativism 
The  correctness  conditions  Nonindexical Contextualism  Nonindexical Relativism 
                                                           
9 This section closely follows Weatherson’s 2009. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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hold  relative  to  the 
contextually relevant fiction 
 
Some of these types of position are familiar from other debates. For example, the first person 
pronoun ‘I’ is given  an indexical contextualist treatment, since the proposition expressed 
when using ‘I’ depends on the speaker’s context. Our standard treatment of possible world 
semantics,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  version  of  nonindexical  contextualism,  since  which 
proposition is expressed does not (typically) depend on the contextually-determined world, 
but  propositions  are  true  relative  to  the  world  of  the  speaker.  Relativist  views  are  less 
familiar, but nonindexical relativism has been championed for a number of areas of discourse 
by  MacFarlane  (2014),  whereas  Weatherson  (2009)  argues  for  an  indexical  relativist 
treatment of indicative conditionals. 
 
We can see that all four styles of view can account for our differential assessments of the 
utterances of (5). As the contexts of the speaker and assessor coincide in the cases above, so 
that the fiction relevant to the correctness of Young Girl’s utterance is Hope, whereas the 
fiction relevant to the correctness of Adult Woman’s utterance is Hope+Empire, all we need 
to show is that both indexicalists and nonindexicalists can account for the data. 
 
An indexicalist (contextualist), like Cameron (2012), claims that Young Girl’s utterance of 
(5) is correct iff 
 
6.  According to Hope, Luke is Vader’s son.
10 
                                                           
10 Cameron (2012: 192) says that Young Girl’s utterance expresses (6), but the indexical contextualist strategy 
does not require this commitment. Moreover, Cameron claims that ‘Star Wars’ is a context-sensitive expression This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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So, as (6) is false, Young Girl’s utterance is incorrect. On the other hand, Adult Woman’s 
utterance of (5) is correct iff 
 
14. According to Hope+Empire, Luke is Vader’s son 
 
is true, which it is. 
 
The nonindexicalist, on the other hand, can say that the correctness condition for both Young 
Girl’s and Adult Woman’s utterances is 
 
15. Fictionally, Luke is Vader’s son,
11 
 
but that (15) is false relative to Hope, making Young Girl’s utterance incorrect, but true 
relative to Hope+Empire, making Adult Woman’s utterance correct. 
 
So far, so good then for our contextualists and relativists. There is more data to be explained, 
however,  as  we  can  pull  apart  the  contexts  of  the  speaker  and  the  assessor.  To  see  this 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
which, in Young Girl’s context, refers to Hope, and so Young Girl’s utterance of (5) expresses (6). But the 
context-sensitivity of ‘Star Wars’ cannot explain how Young Girl expresses (6) with (5), since Young Girl’s 
utterance does not contain a token of ‘Star Wars’. The indexical contextualist should either withdraw from 
claiming that young Girl expresses (6), or else appeal to unarticulated constituents to explain how an utterance 
of (5) expresses (6). 
11 The nonindexicalist cannot employ (6) because, as I argued above, the truth value of (6) does not change. And 
although the truth value of (7) does change, this too does not suit the nonindexicalist’s purposes for the reason I 
give below. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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suppose that in 1980 Adult Woman watches a tape of what Young Girl said in 1977, and 
utters ‘she’s right—Luke is Vader’s son’. It seems that this utterance of Adult Woman’s is 
also correct. As we shall see, this fact cannot be straightforwardly captured by contextualists. 
 
For the indexical contextualist, like Cameron, Young Girl’s utterance is correct iff (6). But 
(6) is false simpliciter (cf. Cameron 2012: 192). As a result Young Girl is not correct and so 
Adult  Woman’s  positive  retrospective  assessment  of  Young  Girl’s  utterance  of  (5)  is 
incorrect according to the indexical contextualist.
12 
 
McGonigal (2013: 173) raised the above problem for indexical contextualism, but it is easy to 
see  that  it  extends  to  nonindexical  contextualism  as  well,  as  MacFarlane  (2007:  22-23) 
observes.  To  see  this,  note  that  on  a  temporalist  view  of  propositions  (nonindexical 
contextualism with respect to times), if I assert at 1pm the proposition that it is raining, and 
you assert this same proposition at 3pm, there is no real sense in which we have agreed 
despite the common proposition asserted. Intuitively, what I said concerned 1pm and what 
you said concerned 3pm, and this is why we do not agree. One can see this by noting that I 
would be incorrect, if it was not raining at 1pm, and yet you would be correct, if it rained at 
3pm. Similarly, you would not be correct at 3pm to say of my earlier utterance, ‘Lee’s right, 
it is raining’. And what applies to nonindexical contextualism with respect to times, applies to 
nonindexical contextualism with respect to fiction: what Young Girl says concerns Hope and 
what Adult Woman says concerns Hope+Empire. As a result, the nonindexical contextualist 
cannot capture the truth of Adult Woman’s positive retrospective assessment of Young Girl. 
 
                                                           
12 This is the familiar (dis)agreement problem for indexical contextualism. I cannot do justice to this subject 
here, but the problem motivates alternative approaches. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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McGonigal also claims that indexical contextualists face a second problem. It is clear that in 
the above set-up Adult Woman and Young Girl were watching the same film, namely Hope. 
McGonigal (2013: 173) claims that the “[indexical] contextualist account sketched above 
does not obviously have the resources to address this”. McGonigal is very brief at this point 
and  offers  no  supporting  argument  for  this  claim.  And  prima  facie  all  that  the  indexical 
contextualist is committed to is that Young Girl’s and Adult Woman’s utterances of (5) are 
subject to different correctness conditions on account of the different fictions being salient in 
the speaker’s contexts, not that they cannot watch the same films. 
 
Nevertheless, I think there is a second challenge here for indexical contextualism. As we 
noted above, not only is there a difference in the felicity of Young Girl’s and Adult Woman’s 
utterances of (5), there is also a corresponding difference in their utterances of 
 
7.  In Hope, Luke is Vader’s son. 
 
But how can the correctness of (7) vary? The indexical contextualist says that the context-
neutral content of an utterance of (5) does not determine a complete correctness condition, for 
it needs to be supplemented with a contextually-determined fiction. But (7) is not like this, 
since  the  overt  linguistic  material  ‘in  Hope’  explicitly  supplies  a  fiction,  namely,  Hope. 
Moreover, why should it be relevant to the correctness of (7) whether Hope is the salient 
fiction or whether both Hope and Empire are salient? After all, (7) stipulates that we are 
restricting our attention to Hope. The nonindexical contextualist, on the other hand, says that 
the proposition expressed by an utterance of (5) is to be assessed relative to a contextually 
supplied fiction. But (7) overtly specifies which fiction it is concerned with and this overrides 
any  contextually  supplied  fiction.  To  see  this  consider  what  we  say  about  nonindexical This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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contextualism concerning worlds or times. Let us stipulate that at w/t it is raining but that 
actually/now it is not raining. Given this, an utterance of ‘At w/t it is raining’ even when 
made actually/now is true. This is because the relevant world/time is not that of the context of 
utterance,  but  rather  that  specified  by  the  utterance.  Further,  (7)  is  not  true  relative  to 
Hope+Empire, say, since Hope and Empire are silent on the issue of (7), as opposed to (5). 
That is, the Star Wars films are not reflexive fictions in that they do not concern themselves. 
And it is hard to see how (7) could be true relative to Hope+Empire in any other way. That is, 
although we allow for truths in fiction which are not the result of what is said, such as in War 
and Peace, there are both fictional and real characters, and in the play Othello, Othello often 
speaks in magnificent blank verse, (7) seems nothing like these. 
 
Cameron (2012: 192) claims that what ‘Star Wars’ refers to is a context-sensitive matter. Can 
the contextualist exploit this alleged context-sensitive to explain the changing correctness of 
(7)? In order for this response to be adequate, the indexical contextualist must say that ‘Hope’ 
can refer to Hope+Empire as well as to Hope.
13 But one need not deny the possibility of 
synecdoche to think this implausible. And, given that ‘in the first Star Wars film made by 
George Lucas, Luke is Vader’s son’ patterns in the same way as (7), the problem ramifies 
since the indexical contextualist also has to claim that ‘the first Star Wars film made by 
George  Lucas’  can  refer  not  only  to  Hope,  but  also  to  Hope+Empire!  But  by  what 
metasemantic mechanism is this achieved? For one thing, Hope+Empire isn’t even a film, let 
alone  the  first  Star  Wars  film  made  by  Lucas.  Because  of  this,  I  don’t  think  such  a 
contextualist explanation of our varying judgements of (7) is credible. 
 
                                                           
13 Cameron himself does not claim that ‘Hope’ is context sensitive in this way, only that ‘”Star Wars’, ‘Darth 
Vader’ etc.” (2012: 192) are. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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Given  the  above  problems  for  contextualism,  it  is  worth  pursuing  other  explanations  of 
McGonigal’s data. McGonigal (2013: 174) himself suggests that we “investigate a range of 
non-standard  forms  of  context  sensitivity”  and  McGonigal  focuses  his  discussion  on 
nonindexical  relativism  (and  as  I’ve  shown  above  nonindexical  contextualism  is 
problematic). 
 
McGonigal (2013: 176) considers the following nonindexical relativist proposal 
 
An utterance of ‘P’ is correct iff ‘P’ is true relative to the set of fictional episodes that 
are salient in the context that the utterance of ‘P’ is assessed from. 
 
Now assuming that McGonigal intends (7) to be a substitution instance of P (cf. McGonigal 
2013: 176), the above relativist correctness conditions cannot be correct. This is because 
given that (7) explicitly specifies that we are concerned only with Hope, the fact that Empire 
is also salient does not affect the felicity of utterances of (7) (compare the analogous problem 
we  raised  for  contextualism  above).  Another  way  to  see  the  problem  is  to  note  that 
McGonigal says that  
 
Truth relative to a set of episodes can be treated as e.g. truth in the 
fiction that such episodes compose or make appropriate. Truth in 
fiction can then also be treated standardly—for example, à la Lewis 
or Walton (McGonigal 2013: 176). 
 This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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But given that Hope+Empire is not a reflexive fiction, (7) is not true in Hope+Empire. To 
illustrate with Lewis’s theory, it is not true in the closest worlds where Hope+Empire is told 
as known fact that in Hope Luke is Vader’s son, since in those worlds there is no Hope.  
 
Nevertheless, I don’t think this is a deep problem for the nonindexical relativist. The above 
account captures all of the above data regarding (5): as (5) is false relative to Hope, Young 
Girl’s utterance assessed in 1977 is incorrect; but as (5) relative to Hope+Empire is true, then 
both Young Girl’s and Adult Woman’s utterance of (5) assessed in 1980 are correct, as is 
Adult Woman’s retrospective assessment of what Young Girl said. And as regards (7), the 
nonindexical relativist can adopt my account of (7) given at the end of §6, but add that what 
counts  as  the  world  of  the  fiction  is  determined  by  the  fictions  salient  in  the  context  of 
assessment, rather than by the eternalist’s maximal fiction. 
 
In any case, in §6-8 I argue that there is no need to embrace relativism, and that if we want to 
treat the case of Young Girl and Adult Woman in the same way that we treat seemingly 
analogous non-fictional cases, then we should not relativize truth to fiction.
14 But first, let’s 
consider the other way in which one might appeal to context to account for McGonigal’s 
data. 
 
5. A Change in the Facts 
                                                           
14 For reasons of space, I cannot offer an extended discussion of an indexical relativist treatment of the above 
data. I merely note that (i) it is unclear whether such an account is compatible with Stalnaker’s account of 
assertion (see Weatherson 2009: 343-344 for discussion), (ii) as with indexical contextualism, such an approach 
has no account of our the varying assessment of (7), and (iii) as I argue below such an account is unnecessary 
and does not offer a unified account of seemingly similar phenomena. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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An alternative explanation of the putative difference in correctness of Young Girl’s and Adult 
Woman’s utterances of (5) is to say that the content of a fiction can change over time as a 
result of the addition of subsequent episodes, and then to appeal not to different contextually-
determined fictions, but to different contextually-determined times. So just as one utterance 
of 
 
16. It is raining 
 
can be false at t and another true at t*, Young Girl’s utterance of (5) made and assessed in 
1977 is false, and yet Adult Woman’s utterance of (5) made and assessed in 1980 is true, in 
virtue of the changing content of Hope. 
 
Now just as there are four views regarding context-sensitivity with respect to fiction, there 
are  four  views  regarding  context-sensitivity  to  time.  In  the  case  of  change,  however, 
relativism is not a plausible option since our assessment of an earlier utterance of (16) does 
not depend on the time of assessment, but on the time of utterance. 
 
A first approach adopts indexical contextualism following Frege (1956: 296) and says that 
the time of utterance affects the correctness conditions of utterances. Applying this approach 
to the case at hand, the correctness condition of Young Girl’s utterance is something like 
 
17. In 1977, in Hope, Vader is Luke’s father, 
 
which sounds false, and so could explain the why Young Girl’s utterances of (5) sounds bad. 
 This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
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On the other hand, the correctness condition of Adult Woman’s utterance of (5) is 
 
18. In 1980, in Hope, Vader is Luke’s father, 
 
which sounds true, and so could explain why Adult Woman’s utterance sounds good. 
 
Alternatively, one might instead follow Prior (1969) and embrace nonindexical contextualism 
which says that the correctness condition of utterances of (5) is given by 
 
7.  In Hope, Luke is Vader’s son, 
 
but that this correctness condition is true relative to the time of utterance. And whereas (7) is 
false relative to 1977, it is true relative to 1980 due to a change in the fictional facts, and it is 
this difference in truth value which explains our differing assessments of Young Girl’s and 
Adult Woman’s utterances. This is the approach taken by Caplan (2014). 
 
Unfortunately, like the contextualist views of the previous section, this approach does not 
capture the retrospective assessment data, and for the same reasons. Indexical contextualism 
fails  because  the  truth  value  of  (17)  does  not  change,  and  as  result  neither  does  the 
correctness of Young Girl’s utterance, meaning that Adult Woman’s positive assessment of 
Young Girl is misplaced. Nonindexical contextualism fails because what Young Girl says 
concerns 1977, whereas what Adult Woman says concerns 1980, and so Adult Woman would 
be wrong to positively assess Young Girl’s earlier utterance (compare what we said about 
nonindexicalism and ‘it is raining’ in §3). 
 This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
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Views which posit a change in the fictional facts are also subject to a second objection (cf. 
Cook, 2014). On such views, there ought to be a true reading of the following, but there 
doesn’t seem to be: 
 
19. Although Vader is Luke’s father, he didn’t used to be. 
 
This is because such views license the truth of 
 
20. In Hope, Vader is Luke’s father, but it was the case that in Hope, Vader is not Luke’s 
father. 
 
Of course, there is also a false reading of (19), namely ‘in Hope, Vader is Luke’s father, but 
he  didn’t  used  to  be’,  but  the  predicted  availability  of  a  true  reading  is  prima  facie 
problematic. In fact, (20) itself should be rejected since in 1980 we would positively assess 
an  utterance  of  (7)  by  Young  Girl  in  1977.  So  regardless  of  the  unavailability  of  a  true 
reading  of  (19),  the  fact  that  they  countenance  (20)  raises  a  problem  for  the  temporal 
contextualist treatment of (5). 
 
Tillman (2014) suggests a slightly different approach which appeals to a change in the facts. 
Rather than saying what is true in Hope changes, Tillman suggests that it is what is true 
according  to  the  Star  Wars  fiction  that  changes  as  the  Star  Wars  fiction  expands  or  is 
rewritten. Tillman’s treatment is as problematic as the above views, however. 
 
First, Young Girl’s utterance concerned the Star Wars fiction in 1977 when, according to it, 
Vader is not Luke’s father. And nothing about this changes as the Star Wars fiction expands. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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As a result Tillman does not capture the retrospective assessment data. Relatedly, Tillman 
predicts the truth of (19) and (20) since according to the Star Wars fiction, Vader is Luke’s 
father, but it was the case that according to the Star Wars fiction, Vader is not Luke’s father. 
Finally, Tillman does not explain the variability of the felicity of sentences which overtly 
contain fiction operators concerning particular episodes, such as ‘in Hope, Vader is Luke’s 
father’.
15 
 
We cannot, then, explain McGonigal’s data by appealing to a change in the fictional facts. 
 
6. Invariantism 
We noted above that there are two ways to address the data that McGonigal presents. The 
first is to say that our differential judgements reflect a difference in correctness. This is the 
route that we explored above. The alternative says that there is no change in correctness, and 
so  the  differential  judgments  are  to  be  explained  in  some  other  way.  Let  us  call  such 
approaches ‘invariantist’, since the correctness of utterances of sentences like (5) is invariant. 
What I do in the remainder of the paper is defend a version of invariantism. 
 
Any  invariantist  position  is  comprised  of  two  parts.  First,  it  gives  invariant  correctness 
conditions for sentences such as (5). Second, since the correctness of Young Girl’s and Adult 
Woman’s  utterances  are  the  same,  it  must  provide  an  alternative  explanation  of  our 
differential  assessment.  Regarding  the  first  element,  the  correctness  conditions  I  wish  to 
endorse are those that say that the invariant fiction relevant to assessing utterances of (5) is 
                                                           
15 Tillman (2014) claims his account provides a solution to the contradiction problem of §3. But it does not, for 
the simple reason that what is true according to Hope does not change, even if what is true according to the Star 
Wars fiction does change. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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the maximal or total narrative, which contains the various ordered 
episodes or instalments as component parts. Thus, in the case of 
[Hope], the relevant fiction is the total Star Wars story, as revealed 
in whatever (canonical) episodes have been or will be produced. 
On this account [Young Girl’s] utterance in 1977 is not worse than 
[Adult  Woman’s]  later  utterance  in  point  of  [correctness],  since 
both are [we may assume, correct] (McGonigal 2013: 168).
16 
 
McGonigal’s primary objection to these invariantist correctness conditions is that adopting 
them would make readers ignorant of the fictional facts: 
 
it seems to always be an eminently open epistemic possibility that 
The Amazing Spiderman series will conclude with an episode that 
reveals that all the events portrayed in previous comics were only, 
for example, imaginative dreams … But it beggars belief that when 
reading the comic books in the 1960s, ordinary readers were not in 
a position to know that Peter Parker was the superhero Spiderman, 
that he battled the Green Goblin, etc. The point is not only that 
such  truths  seem  canonical,  partially  constitutive  of  the  very 
fictional  world  of  The  Amazing  Spiderman.  …  Much  of  our 
capacity to enjoy such popular fictions would be undermined if we 
were not allowed to take ourselves to know what was happening in 
a given episode … But given [invariantism] about fictional truth, 
                                                           
16 McGonigal labels this ‘extreme realism’, but in what sense is this view extreme? This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
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together with the freedom of narrative creation, reinvention, and 
post  hoc  correction  which  comprise  an  important  and  familiar 
aspect of many such popular fictions, it becomes difficult to see 
how  we  could  ever  be  in  a  position  to  claim  such  knowledge 
(McGonigal 2013: 170). 
 
McGonigal makes a number of claims in this passage but the essence of his argument is as 
follows: 
 
21. If invariantism is true, an utterance of ‘Peter Parker is dreaming’ in the 60s is correct. 
 
22. If an utterance of ‘Peter Parker is dreaming’ in the 60s is correct, then readers of the 
Spiderman comics in the 60’s did not know that Peter Parker is a superhero. 
 
23. Readers in the 60s did know that Peter Parker is a superhero. 
 
24. Therefore, invariantism is false. 
 
The argument is valid and (21) captures the invariantist correctness conditions that above, so 
it is clear that the invariantist must reject at least one of (22) or (23). 
 
What McGonigal says to support (23) does not, in fact, entail it. McGonigal claims that in 
order to successfully engage with the fiction we must be allowed to take ourselves to know 
what is happening. But one can take oneself to know something even if one doesn’t know it. 
In any case, what seems to be the datum which any theory should respect is that readers of This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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the comics in the 60s knew what is true according to those comics. But the invariantist can 
allow for that, since it is true according to those comics that Peter Parker is a superhero. So if 
we read (22) as concerning knowledge of what is true according to the comics, then (22) is 
false. It is not further required that 60s readers know that according to the maximal fiction 
that Parker is a superhero, since, as things turn out, he is not. Moreover, the grounds on which 
60s readers would claim that Parker is a superhero would be the same grounds on which 
readers of the 60s comics today, unaware of the later comics, would also make that claim. 
But  as  McGonigal  himself  concedes,  such  grounds  are  not  decisive,  since  in  the  case 
McGonigal describes it is false today that Parker is a superhero. 
 
So, McGonigal’s chief objection to the proposed invariantist correctness conditions fails. As 
noted  above,  though,  any  invariantist  must  also  offer  an  explanation  of  our  differing 
judgments of Young Girl’s and Adult Woman’s utterances in terms other than correctness. 
McGonigal considers and rejects one particular invariantist explanation of these judgements: 
 
the intuitive difference between the two assertions is explained by 
the fact that [Young Girl, unlike Adult Woman] is not in a position 
to  acquire  any  suitable  warrant  for  [her]  claim,  given  our 
stipulation that there are no properties of the first film that might be 
appealed to in support of it (McGonigal 2013: 168). 
 
McGonigal  argues  convincingly,  however,  that  this  invariantist  explanation  is  not 
compelling: 
 This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
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Suppose that both [Young Girl and Adult Woman] utter ‘There is a 
donkey next door’ when there is a donkey next door, but neither are 
in a good position to know that. Suppose further that the donkey is 
separated  from  [Adult  Woman]  by  an  unlocked  door,  and  from 
[Young Girl] by a locked door. This scenario seems analogous to 
the view of the original cases … In each case, a truth is uttered 
without good evidence, but one subject is in a better position to 
access that truth than the other. It doesn’t seem, however, that we 
respond to the two pairs of cases analogously (McGonigal 2013: 
170). 
 
McGonigal’s example shows that it is not merely a difference in epistemic accessibility that 
explains our differential assessment of utterances of (5). But invariantism is not committed to 
explaining our differing assessments in this manner. We can make a start on giving a better 
invariantist explanation by noting that McGonigal’s donkey case and the Star Wars case are 
disanalogous. In particular, in the Star Wars case there is a change in our evidence between 
assessing the utterances of ‘Luke is Vader’s son’, whereas there is no such change in our 
evidence  between  assessing  the  utterances  in  McGonigal’s  donkey  case.    If  we  are  to 
construct  a  case  analogous  to  the  Star  Wars  case,  we  should  mirror  this  feature  of  the 
original. So let us alter McGonigal’s donkey case accordingly. 
 
At t1 Young Girl is on the top floor of a skyscraper in room A, which is next to the locked 
room B. Young Girl has no good reason to think that there is a donkey in room B. Moreover, 
Young Girl has good evidence against there being a donkey in room B: she usually sneezes 
violently when there is a donkey around, and yet she is not sneezing; donkeys are not very This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
 
26 
 
often found on the top floor of skyscrapers; Young Girl presses her ear to the wall adjoining 
room B and hears nothing. Observing from the corridor, we share her evidence. Nevertheless, 
Young Girl utters 
 
25. There is a donkey next door. 
 
At t2 the door of room B is opened and, much to our surprise, we see what certainly looks 
like a donkey. 
 
At t3 Adult Woman, who is in room C on the other side of room B, also utters (25). Adult 
Woman is also allergic to donkeys and has the same evidence against their being a donkey in 
room B as does Young Girl. 
 
I think that in this case, as in McGonigal’s original Star Wars case it is “natural to feel that 
[Young Girl’s utterance as assessed at t1] is in some sense worse than [Adult Woman’s as 
assessed at t3” (McGonigal 2013: 166). Moreover, once we reassess Young Girl’s utterance 
from t3, it sounds correct, just as Adult Woman’s retrospective assessment of Young Girl’s 
utterance of (5) did. More generally, when we have lots of evidence for ~p and someone says 
that p, we think the utterance infelicitous. But then if we come to have lots of evidence for p, 
utterances of p sound (more) felicitous regardless of whether they occurred before or after our 
evidence gathering. 
 
The  suggestion,  then,  is  that  current  instalments  of  a  serial  fiction  represent  defeasible 
evidence for what is true according to the maximal fiction of which it is a part. So when the 
only evidence for truth in the maximal Star Wars fiction is Hope, utterances of ‘Vader is This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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Luke’s father’ sound bad as this is not what the evidence supports. But when the evidence 
also includes Empire, utterances of (5) now sound good as this is what the new, expanded 
evidence supports. That is, Empire defeats the evidence we had for rejecting (5) by provided 
a rebutting defeater.
17 
 
Now, just as we do not take the revised donkey case above to motivate relativizing truth to 
the assessor’s evidence, we should not take the Star Wars case to motivate relativizing truth 
to the assessor’s evidence (the fiction of the assessor’s context). What changes in both cases 
is not the correctness of the utterances, but rather our ability to assess them as correct. A 
more natural conclusion is that the correctness of an utterance depends on the facts, whereas 
our  ability  to  assess  utterances  as  correct  depends  on  our  evidence.  By  adopting  these 
independently plausible principles, and by appealing to facts about the total maximal fiction, 
we have a unified explanation of both the Star Wars case and the revised donkey case. It is 
for this reason, then, that we should prefer invariantism to relativism. 
 
One might object, however, that when Young Girl utters (5) there are no present-tensed facts 
that make her utterance correct, but when Young Girl utters (25) there is a present-tensed fact 
that makes this correct. But we can generate the same patterning as in the Star Wars case as 
we  do  with  non-fictional  cases  that  concern  the  future.  Consider  the  following  scenario. 
Ingrid is watching a game of baseball between the Northampton No Hopers and the Inverness 
Invincibles.  In the  first  innings of the  game the No-Hopers miraculously  score a run.  In 
                                                           
17  On  defeasible  reasoning  and  evidence,  see  Pollock  (1987).  Serial  fiction  also  provides  instances  of 
undercutting defeaters, as in the case of Peter Parker dreaming discussed above. Wright (2008: 179-182) notes 
that the kind of patterning we have been discussing could not motivate relativism over a defeasibly grounded 
assertion of the type advocated here. This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
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response, Ingrid says ‘that is the winning strike’. Given that the Invincibles have never been 
beaten, have always scored at least ten runs, and that Ingrid has no inside information or 
expertise, Ingrid’s utterance sounds bad. As things go, no more runs are scored, and so the 
No-Hopers improbably beat the Invincibles one-nil. After the game, but without knowing the 
score, Brigit settles down to watch a recording of the game. Upon seeing the strike she says 
‘that is the winning strike’. Brigit’s utterance, whatever other defects it may have, is clearly 
correct. Similarly, we can retrospectively report that Ingrid was right. So in these ways what 
we want to say about the baseball game matches what we want to say about unplanned serial 
fiction. But there is no tendency to relativize truth to evidence in this case, so given the 
analogous nature of the Star Wars case, we should not relativize to fiction (evidence) there 
either.  The  invariantist,  then,  provides  a  uniform  explanation  of  all  the  cases  discussed: 
correctness turns on the facts, our ability to judge correctly depends on our evidence.
18 
 
We noted above that our assessment of utterances of 
 
7.  In Hope, Luke is Vader’s son 
 
                                                           
18 Cook (2014) also notes that installments provide defeasible evidence for what is true in the serial fiction. He 
concludes from this, however, that statements such as (5) have no truth value, only probabilities. But as we have 
just seen, the fact that there can be defeasible evidence for something does not warrant this conclusion. Cook 
also  disputes  the  positive  retrospective  assessment  of  Young  Girl’s  utterance  claiming  that  it  would  be 
“perverse” to claim this utterance was correct; rather we should say “you haven’t got evidence for that yet”.  But 
it is clear that Young Girl’s utterance of (5) was correct, just as her utterance of (25) was. Of course, it would be 
appropriate in both cases to respond that Young Girl didn’t have evidence for her claim, but why would that 
mean that her utterance was not correct in the relevant sense? This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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varies as well as our assessment of utterances of (5). Again, I want to say that the correctness 
of (7) does not vary and what is correct is tied to the maximal fiction. However, it is not 
plausible to say that in Hope P iff according to the maximal Star Wars fiction, P. To see this 
notice that whereas 
 
26. According to the Star Wars episodes so far, Luke visits Yoda on Dagobah 
 
is true, 
 
27. In Hope, Luke visits Yoda on Dagobah 
 
is not, since Luke doesn’t visit Yoda until Empire. 
 
So  what,  then,  should  the  invariantist  say  about  the  truth  conditions  of  (7)?  What  later 
episodes of Star Wars reveal is what had to obtain in Hope in order for the later episodes to 
be true. Given that it is true in/according to Empire that Luke is Vader’s son and that ‘is 
Vader’s son’ is a substance sortal, then it had to be the case in Hope that Luke is Vader’s son. 
To put the point another way, consider the world of the Star Wars fictions. ‘In Hope P’ is true 
iff P is true in the world of the Star Wars fiction limited to the spatiotemporal segment of the 
world Hope is concerned with. Given that Luke is Vader’s son in the Star Wars world, Luke 
is Vader’s son in the earlier portion of that world which is the subject matter of Hope. It is not 
as if Luke is not Vader’s son until later on in this world. But given that Luke doesn’t visit 
Yoda until a later time, (27) is false, since Luke does not visit Yoda until later on in this 
world. 
 This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
 
30 
 
Having outlined an invariantist treatment of the data, in the following sections I consider two 
objections to this account 
 
7. No Maximal Fiction 
The above invariantist proposal tacitly assumed that a given fictional episode is part of single 
maximal fiction. But this assumption can fail. First, a fictional episode need not be part of a 
single maximal fiction. It could be that for each fictional episode in a series, there is a later 
one. What should the invariantist say about such cases? In the case where P is true according 
to the fictional series from some point onwards, the invariantist should say that an utterance 
of ‘P’ is correct. So instead of saying that an utterance of P concerning a fictional episode E 
is correct iff P is true according to the maximal fiction of which E is a part, the invariantist 
should say instead say that this utterance is correct iff there is some fiction F of which E is a 
part, according to which, P, and for any fiction F* of which E is a part such that it is not the 
case that according to F*, P, then F* is a proper part of F. But what if there is no point from 
which P is true onwards? Well then the correctness condition predicts that there is no correct 
thing to say. But this doesn’t seem especially problematic. In such a case our judgements as 
to what is correct will not be stable, and the invariantist says this reflects the fact that there is 
nothing stable to aim at. 
 
Second, a fictional episode will not be part of a single maximal fiction when an episode has 
two sequels neither of which are sequels of the other. To deal with such branching serial 
fictions  a  modicum  of  context-sensitivity  is  called  for.  If  a  single  branch  of  which  the 
fictional episode is particularly salient, then what governs the correctness of an utterance is 
what is true according to the maximal fiction of the contextually salient branch. If branch A is 
salient in your context, and branch B salient in my context, then if you say P and I say not P it This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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seems that we are not disagreeing, but are instead talking past one another.
19 This is precisely 
what this contextualist position predicts. 
 
If  two  or  more  branches  are  contextually  salient,  however,  this  appeal  to  contextualism 
doesn’t  help.  One  obvious  approach  would  be  to  supervaluate  across  the  branches.  This 
yields the result that an utterance is correct iff it is true according to all maximal branches, 
false iff it is false according to all maximal branches, and is otherwise indeterminate. Another 
approach  would  be  to  subvaluate  and  replace  the  definite  article  in  the  analysis  with  an 
indefinite one: an utterance of ‘P’ is correct (incorrect) iff it is true (false) according to at 
least one maximal branch. Of course such an approach would allow an utterance of ‘P’ to be 
correct and also an utterance of ‘~P’ to be correct. This result is mitigated by the fact that it 
does not license a correct utterance of ‘P&~P’. 
 
In any case, any explanation of McGonigal’s data also has to address the case of branching 
fictions. And as one cannot assume that a context of utterance or assessment will determine a 
unique branch, contextualists and relativists have to contemplate supervaluation, subvaluation 
and other approaches. In this way, then, branching fictions differ from the branching worlds 
picture of future contingents. On such a picture of temporal reality, whilst there are many 
forward branches at a time, there is only a single backward branch at a time. But as we have 
seen this need not be the case with serial fiction. 
20 
                                                           
19 This is why I invoke contextualism rather than relativism. 
20 As well as branching, serial fictions can also merge, with two distinct fictional series being succeeded by a 
single fictional episode. Such possibilities raise issues when we consider past tense claims such as ‘Luke used to 
live on Tatooine’. Such a claim may be true on one branch of a serial fiction but not another. Whichever option 
one favours for dealing with forward branching can presumably also be applied to such backward branching 
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Finally, the assumption that any given fictional episode is part of a single maximal fiction can 
fail in both of the previous ways simultaneously. But such a double failure does not seem to 
raise any especial problem not raised by the individual failures discussed above. 
 
8. Eternalism vs Relativism 
The above invariantist account assumes that there are eternalist truths now about how the 
maximal fiction, of which a particular episode is a part, will go. If there are no such facts, 
then none of the utterances of (5) will come out as true, since, at best, it is indeterminate 
whether according to [what will be] the maximal Star Wars fiction, Luke is Vader’s son. But 
such a result does not accord with our intuitive verdicts on Young Girl’s and Adult Woman’s 
utterances of (5). It is for this reason, then, that adopting a relativist approach towards future 
contingents, such as MacFarlane’s (2014), is of no help in solving McGonigal’s puzzle. 
 
McGonigal objects that the invariantist thus presupposes a controversial semantics, according 
to which there are truths concerning what future episodes of fictions will be like. Further, 
McGonigal takes it to be “methodologically uncomfortable to have to take a stand on such 
matters in order to account for what is going on in soap operas and comic books” (McGonigal 
2013: 169). 
 
It is not clear that McGonigal himself is entitled to this objection, since he seems to think that 
there are truths about the future. In particular, he claims (2013: 166) that in 1977 
 
28. It will turn out that Luke is Darth’s son 
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is true, albeit a lucky guess. But this is precisely the attitude the invariantist takes to (5). In 
any case, it seems that the relativist would do better to deny that (28), since combined with 
the falsity of (5) in 1977, (28) yields the abominable conjunction it is not the case that Luke is 
Darth’s  son,  but  it  will  turn  out  that  Luke  is  Darth’s  son!  (Compare,  Smith  is  not  the 
murderer, but it will turn out that he is.) The fact that McGonigal was so ready to sign up to 
the truth of (28), however, reveals how easily eternalist thinking comes to us. 
 
To return to the objection, we can concede that the weaker the assumptions a theory has to 
make, the stronger it is, whilst maintaining that there is no reason why an invariantist should 
not appeal to what she takes to be the best semantics of time in order to explain McGonigal’s 
data. Moreover, she may take McGonigal’s data to be some of what a semantics of time 
needs to explain: for the eternalist, serial fictions are just another source of future contingents. 
And this is reflected by the fact that the patterning one finds in cases of standard future 
contingents, such as in the baseball example of §6, is the same as one finds in the case of our 
assessment  of  utterances  of  (5).  The  eternalist,  but  the  not  the  relativist,  has  a  uniform 
explanation of the two, and what is more, the eternalist’s semantic framework is simpler. 
 
Further, it is not as if the nonindexical relativist does not have commitments of her own. 
Wright (2008) argues that the relativist is committed to either saying that the content of (5) is 
non-representational,  or  else  that  there  is  not  a  unique  actual  world,  for  the  facts  that 
constitute the actual world change over time in virtue of the facts that constitute the fictional 
world changing over time. Relatedly, Wright (2008: 161) notes that for the relativist whether 
(5) is true depends not only on what it says and how the worlds is, but also “on who judges it 
and  their  state  at  the  point  of  judgement”.  But  such  a  commitment  runs  counter  to  our 
intuitive picture of truth.  This is an electronic version of a paper forthcoming in British Journal of Aesthetics. Please refer to 
the published version. 
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The  invariantist  and  the  relativist,  then,  each  take  on  commitments  when  explaining 
McGonigal’s data. I have argued that the invariantist account set out above can account for 
the data at least as well as McGonigal’s relativism, and so serial fictions do not present a 
compelling case for truth relativism.  If there are no truths about future contingents, then 
fictional relativism is a possibility, but note that fictional relativism does not address the 
issues  raised  by  such  an  open  future  in  general.  But  if  there  are  truths  about  future 
contingents, then relativism is unnecessary. Moreover, since McGonigal’s case seems on all 
fours with the cases discussed in §6, we should expect a similar treatment of them. This the 
invariantist  provides.  What  is  more,  from  the  invariantist  perspective,  unplanned  serial 
fiction, planned serial fiction, and non-serial fiction (see n8) are all of a piece and are to be 
treated  with  the  same  invariantist  correctness  conditions  given  in  §6.  There  is,  then,  a 
pleasing uniformity to invariantism.
21 
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